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A perfectly competitive spatial partial equilibrium model is constructed to evaluate some of the 
policy effects on world poultry trade. The model simulates the trade flows among six key 
exporting and importing countries and two aggregate rest-of-world regions. Effects of removal of 
restrictions based on tariffs, tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) and sanitary regulations are evaluated 
maintaining a distinction between “high-value” (mostly white meat) and “low-value” (mostly 
dark meat) poultry products. Results suggest that removal of sanitary barriers alone has relatively 
little effect compared to removal of tariffs and TRQs, but has more effect if sanitary and other 
barriers are removed simultaneously. Imposition of new sanitary barriers against US products by 
Russia would also shift trade flows, with production rising in Brazil. 
 
 
  World poultry markets are one of the most rapidly growing sectors of the food industry. 
Poultry production rose six-fold between 1965 and 2000 to over 65 million tons. Consumption 
increases have exceeded population growth, with world per capita supplies of poultry meat 
tripling from 3.3 kg in 1965 to more than 10 kg in 2000.  International trade has more than kept 
pace with this industry growth. World exports of poultry meat rose from 375,000 tons in 1965 to 
over 6.5 million tons in 2000.  Thus, trade now accounts for about 10 percent of world 
consumption.  
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effects of sanitary barriers to trade related to 
avian and human health in the context of the broader set of economic factors and policy 
decisions that determine product flows in international poultry markets.  Poultry flocks are 
susceptible to diseases that can spread domestically and across borders.  Microbial contamination 
of poultry for human consumption is also a serious problem in the sector, as with other meats, 
and is addressed by health regulations in exporting and importing countries.  In addition, 
intensive poultry production can cause local environmental problems through pollution of   2
groundwater, and the conditions under which chickens are kept have been subject to criticism 
from health and animal-welfare advocates.  Thus, poultry markets are subject to a complex mix 
of national and trade regulations, together with traditional (nontechnical) tariff and nontariff 
barriers.  The 1995 Uruguay Round Agreements on Agriculture and on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures have, to some extent, affected this mix, reducing or 
freezing levels of producer support while tightening the rules for sanitary measures. 
To evaluate some of the policy effects on world poultry trade, a perfectly competitive 
spatial partial equilibrium model is constructed to simulate the trade flows among six key 
exporting and importing countries and two aggregate rest-of-world regions.  We model the 
production, consumption, trade, and price outcomes maintaining a distinction between “high-
value” poultry products, going into Japan the EU and elsewhere, and “low-value” poultry 
products, which are imported primarily into China, Russia, and other countries.  Effects are 
evaluated from removal of restrictions based on tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), sanitary 
regulations, or both types of barriers.  
Model 
  A perfectly competitive spatial partial equilibrium model is used to represent the global 
poultry sector.
1   There are eight regions in the model:  United States (US), Brazil, European 
Union (EU), Japan, China, Russia, a rest-of-world poultry exporting region (ROWE), and a rest-
of-world poultry importing region (ROWM).  The non-composite regions were chosen because 
                                                 
1 The analysis developed herein builds on discussion of the global poultry industry, trade policies, and very 
preliminary assessment of policy impacts presented by Orden, Josling and Roberts in “Product Differentiation, 
Sanitary Barriers, and Arbitrage in World Poultry Markets” (chapter 8 of Global Food Trade and Consumer Demand 
for Quality (Barry Krissoff, Mary Bohman and Julie A. Caswell, editors), New York, Kluwer Academic /Plenum 
Publishers, 2002, pp. 147-164. 
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they account for a significant portion of world poultry production (approximately 70 percent) 
and poultry trade (approximately 90 percent of all exports and 75 percent of all imports).  
Poultry Sector 
  All production, processing, and distribution activities within each region are aggregated 
into one industry.  This level of aggregation is a simplifying assumption and reflects that for 
some regions, such as the United States, the production and processing activities are vertically 
integrated.  
Because a wide range of poultry products is traded, two distinct poultry products are 
included in the model:  high-value and low-value poultry products.  The high-value poultry 
product includes white meat (breasts and wings) of chicken and turkey along with de-boned meat 
and specialty items.  Low-value poultry is comprised of mainly dark meat (drumsticks and 
thighs) of chicken and turkey.  This distinction is a reflection that certain countries, such as the 
United States, mainly export (or import) dark (or white) meat due to the preferences of domestic 
consumers.  Because white and dark meats are produced in fixed amounts per bird, they are 
treated as jointly produced goods in the model.   
All poultry firms are assumed to employ constant returns to scale technology.
2  This 
assumption is necessary in order for all firms to earn zero economic profits.  For a perfectly 
competitive firm, the first-order condition for profit maximization states that price must equal 
marginal cost.  Only in the case where marginal cost equals average cost will requirements of 
profit maximization and zero profits occur.  Poultry firms are also assumed to use two aggregate 
inputs:  an input that is specific to the sector and a non-sector specific input.  The non-sector 
specific factor may be thought to consist of feed, fuel, and certain types of labor and capital that 
                                                 
2   The assumption that all firms employ constant returns to scale technology also permits aggregation across firms 
and an industry cost function will exist.   4
are not specific to the poultry sector.
3  The sector specific input may be thought to include 
physical and human capital, such as poultry houses or processing equipment that have little or no 
use outside of the poultry sector and management with specific knowledge about the poultry 
sector.  Because the poultry sector is assumed to be a relatively small user of feed, fuel, etc., 
changes in the level of poultry production will not affect the price of the non-sector specific 
input.  This implies that the supply of this input to the poultry sector is perfectly elastic.  
Conversely, in order to build more production or processing facilities or train new managers, the 
poultry sector must bid that capital away from other uses within the economy.  Thus, the supply 
of the sector specific input is assumed to be upward sloping.  This implies that to expand poultry 
output, the sector must use more of the specific input and pay a higher factor price, thereby 
increasing both marginal and average cost,
4 yielding an upward sloping poultry output supply 
function. 
Consumer Demand 
  Consumer demand for poultry products in each region is represented by a four-level 
nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) demand system (see figure 1).  At the bottom 
level, consumers choose among imported high-value poultry products or low-value poultry 
products.  We have chosen to use an Armington specification for two reasons.  First, within the 
high or low-value product categories, there is some variation across countries in the specific 
types of high or low-value products being exported.  Thus, the low-value poultry being exported 
from the US is not exactly the same products as the low-value poultry from Brazil.  Second, 
because it should cost the same to transport either low-value or high-value between two regions, 
                                                 
3   For example, lower skill workers employed in the production or processing activities of the sector. 
4   Only in the special case of all inputs being perfect substitutes would average and marginal cost not increase.  
Given the definition of the aggregate inputs used in the model, they are not viewed as perfect substitutes.   5
it is not possible to replicate the benchmark high-value and low-value trade flows assuming low-
value and high-value poultry products are homogeneous. 
  In the second-level of the nested CES demand system, consumers choose between a 
domestically produced and an aggregate imported low-value or high-value poultry product.  So if 
imports become more expensive relative to domestically produced poultry, consumers will 
substitute away from imports.  At the third-level, consumers choose between aggregate high-
value and low-value poultry products.  If the aggregate price of high-value poultry, which is a 
function of the f.o.b. price of imports and the domestic price of high-value poultry, increases 
relative to the aggregate price of low-value poultry, consumers will increase their consumption 
of low-value poultry and decrease their consumption of high-value poultry.  At the top-level of 
the demand system, consumers choose between an aggregate poultry product and all other 
products.  This allows for consumers to increase or decrease their overall consumption of poultry 
products as the aggregate relative price of poultry changes. 
Government Policies 
  The base year of the model is 1998.  During that year, all non-composite regions imposed 
tariffs on imported poultry products.  Table 1 summarizes the tariff levels imposed by these 
regions.  The Japanese import market has the lowest tariffs of all of the non-composite regions.  
This in part reflects the Japanese government’s encouragement of foreign investment by 
Japanese poultry firms in Brazil, Thailand, and China.  China and Russia both have state trading 
structures that have survived economic reforms.  This may allow these countries to direct trade 
towards particular exporters.  Also, both China and Russia have contiguous countries (Hong 
Kong in the case of China, and the Baltic countries in the case of Russia) with lower or zero 
tariffs where trade may enter.  In the past, poultry products have entered China through Hong   6
Kong, due to zero tariffs, good port facilities, and regulations discouraging direct sales to China.
5  
In the case of Russia, transshipments of poultry products through the Baltic countries are being 
discouraged. 
  The EU has established tariff rate quotas (TRQ) that are allocated to Brazil, countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe who have quota-restricted preferential access under the Europe 
Agreements, Canada, and Mexico.  Both the US and Brazil using use tariffs to protect their 
poultry markets.  
  Because poultry flocks are susceptible to diseases, particularly when they are kept in 
intensive production facilities, and microbial contamination of poultry meat is a serious problem, 
many countries have sanitary regulations that impose restrictions on exports from one or several 
countries.  Table 2 summarizes whether there are binding sanitary (SPS) barriers between the six 
non-composite regions in the model.  One might expect that these countries would divide into 
two groups, those free of highly infectious poultry diseases and those that are not free of disease, 
and trade would occur within each group.  However, this is not the case.  The major importers of 
poultry products, China, Japan, and Russia, accept imports from all exporting regions in the 
model.  The two major exporters, the US and Brazil, do not accept imports from each other and 
also ban imports from China, given recurrent outbreaks of Newcastle Disease.  The EU also bans 
imports from the US and from China. 
  The main point of disagreement between the US and the EU focuses on the use of end-of-
line chlorine decontamination in US processing facilities.  The EU does not consider this to be 
equivalent to trisodiummonophosphate or lactic acid decontamination, and therefore bans poultry 
imports from the US.  Imports of poultry from Brazil into the US are banned based on 
                                                 
5  A recent US-China agreement has dealt with some of these problems and thus direct sales to China from the US 
are likely to increase.   7
intermittent outbreaks of poultry diseases in Brazil.  It is interesting to note that the EU does not 
find Brazil’s disease problem a reason to block imports.  Finally, Brazil’s SPS barrier against 
imports from the US is based on the decision that the inspection system for poultry processing 
plants in the US is not equivalent to its own. 
Data 
  The benchmark bilateral trade flows are obtained from the United Nation’s trade 
database.
6  The UN trade data distinguishes six, five-digit SITC categories for trade in poultry 
products.  These SITC categories separate poultry into whole birds, cuts, and livers, as well as 
between fresh or chilled and frozen.  The dominant SITC category is 01235, “Poultry cuts and 
offal (other than livers) frozen,” which accounts for nearly 70 percent of world (excluding intra-
EU) poultry trade.  The next largest category is SITC 01232, “Poultry not cut in pieces, frozen,” 
which accounts for approximately 20 percent of world poultry trade.   
  The UN trade database contains information on the quantity, in metric tons, and the value 
of poultry trade in each category.  The bilateral trade flows were assigned to either the high-
value or low-value category based on the computed unit value.  For example, the computed unit 
values of US poultry exports to Japan is nearly twice of the computed unit value of US exports to 
China and Russia (see Table 3).  Thus, all US poultry exports to China and Russia are assumed 
to be low-value products while all US exports to Japan are assumed to be high-value products.  
Table 4 shows all of the benchmark high-value and low-value bilateral trade flows.  It is 
interesting to note that Japan is an importer of high-value products while China and Russia are 
importers of low-value products.  The US and the EU are exporters primarily of low-value 
poultry products while China is an exporter of high-value products.  Brazil exports both high- 
and low-value products. 
                                                 
6   Access to the UN data was provided by Mark Gehlhar, ERS/USDA.   8
  The level of poultry production for each region is given in the first column of Table 4.  It 
is the 1998 estimate of poultry meat production obtained from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations FAOSTAT database.  Poultry production for the two 
composite rest-of-world regions is obtained by subtracting the quantity of poultry meat produced 
in China, the EU, Brazil, Japan, Russia, and the US from world poultry production.  That 
estimate is then equally divided between the poultry importing rest-of-world composite region 
(ROWM) and the poultry exporting rest-of-world (ROWE) region. 
  Data on prices of high and low-value poultry products by region were not available.  We 
estimated the overall magnitude of these prices based on the reported unit trade values and 
estimated transportation costs.  Prices for each region were determined as part of model 
calibration process that is described in the next section. 
Calibration 
  To implement the model, the parameters of the CES demand functions for poultry 
products, the supply functions for the poultry sector specific input, and poultry sector industry 
cost function must be chosen in order to replicate the benchmark data in Table 4.  We will begin 
by describing the calibration procedures for the CES demand functions. 
  The CES utility and sub-utility functions for each level of the demand system in figure 1 
















 ∑∑ ,          ( 1 )  
where  j α is a shift parameter to be determined during calibration,  j x is the quantity of good j 
consumed, n is the number of goods consumed, and σ is the elasticity of substitution for that   9
level in the nested CES demand structure.  The resulting demand function and true cost-of-living 

































 ∑ ,           ( 3 )  
 
where I is total or group expenditures,  j p is the price of good j, and  M P is the price index.   
  The calibration process for the CES demand system begins at high and low-value import 
sub-utility functions because it is the only level where both initial quantities and expenditure are 
observed.  Because removing trade barriers could alter the observed pattern of trade, assuming 
that  j α α = , allows  j α to be eliminate from equations (2) and (3).
7  Otherwise, if region i did not 
import from region j in the benchmark, the only way for  j x to equal zero is for  j α to equal zero.  
But this would imply that corner solution represented by consumers in region i not purchasing 
imports from region j would be due to preferences only, excluding the possibility that a lower 
price would induce consumption.  Clearly, this is not an appropriate assumption.  The 
implication of assuming  j α α = is that all imports will be consumed in equal amounts if all 
import prices are the same.   
  Using equation (2), the prices of imported high-value or low-value poultry products are 
determined to match the benchmark trade flows and expenditures.  Because imported poultry 
products are likely considered good substitutes, an elasticity of substitution equal to 10 is used 
for all high-value and low-value imports.  For example, consider the imports of high-value 
                                                 
7   This is due to the ordinal properties of all utility functions.  If all α’s are equal in equation (1), then a monotonic 
transformation will allow them to be removed without altering the preference structure of the utility function.   10
poultry into Japan.  In the benchmark, four regions, the US, Brazil, China, and ROWE export 
461,000 mt. of high-value poultry to Japan at a value of $844.1 million.  A system of four 
equations, representing the quantity of high-value poultry imported from each region, in four 
unknowns, the import prices, is then solved.
8  The resulting import prices are tariff inclusive 
f.o.b. prices.  Thus, dividing the calibrated import price by the tariff rate and then subtracting the 
estimated transportation cost determines the domestic price for each of the exporting countries.  
Continuing with the Japan example, the calibrated import prices per mt. are $2,232 for the US, 
$2,262 for Brazil, $2,033 for China, and $2,124 for ROWE.  Dividing by the assumed 10 percent 
tariff rate and subtracting the transportation costs given in Table 5 yields the domestic prices 
listed in Table 4 for these regions.
9  The domestic price of high-value poultry in Japan is 
estimated to approximately equal the average import price. 
  The same procedure is used to determine the import prices in all importing regions.  The 
calibrated import prices of high-value poultry to the EU are not used to determine domestic 
prices in Brazil and ROWE because they contain TRQ rents.  Also, the calibrated import prices 
for ROWM for high-value and low-value poultry are not used to determine domestic prices 
because an aggregate tariff rate is not available.   
  Once all domestic prices for all products have been determined, the parameters in the 
remaining CES utility and sub-utility functions are determined.  However, since all remaining 
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8   The system of nonlinear equations is solved using the CNS solver in GAMS. 
9   The transportation costs were adjusted slightly in order to round the poultry prices to the nearest $10/mt.   11
For example, consider the sub-utility functions that govern the substitution between domestic 
and import poultry products.  Then  j x is the quantity of the high-value (low-value) domestic 
poultry product consumed,  j p is the domestic price,  k p is the import price index, determined 
using equation (3), σ  is the elasticity of substitution, and I is expenditure on high-value (low-
value) poultry products.  Assuming elasticities of substitution of 8 between domestic and 
imported poultry products in the base case, only the parameter α is unknown in equation (4).  
Similarly, for the sub-utility function that governs substitution between high-value and low-value 
poultry,  j x  is the aggregate quantity of high-value poultry consumed,  j p and  k p are the price 
indices for high-value and low-value poultry, σ  is the elasticity of substitution between high-
value and low-value poultry products (assumed to equal 0.5 in the base case), and I is total 
expenditure on poultry.  Finally, at the top-level of the nested CES utility function,  j x  is the 
aggregate quantity of poultry consumed,  j p and  k p are the price indices for poultry and all other 
products (which is assumed to be constant and equal to one), σ  is the elasticity of substitution 
between poultry products and all other products (assumed to equal 0.25 in the base case), and I is 
GDP for the region. 
  The poultry supply elasticity in each region is derived from the zero profit condition, the 
demand for the specific factor, and the specific factor supply equation.  Formally, the supply 
elasticity can be expressed as: 








= ,            ( 5 )  
where 
s
p η  is the poultry supply elasticity,  s η  is the supply elasticity of the specific factor,  v c  and 
z c  are cost shares of non-specific and specific factors, and  vz σ  is the elasticity of substitution   12
between the non-specific and specific factors in poultry production.  Assuming that  0 vz σ = , the 
poultry supply elasticity depends on the specific factor supply elasticity and its cost share.   
Results 
  The model developed in the previous section is used to analyze the impacts on the global 
poultry sector of four alternative policy scenarios.  First, we remove all tariffs and TRQ’s but 
leave any SPS barriers in place.  Second, we remove only the SPS barriers.  Third, we remove all 
trade barriers, a true free trade scenario.  The final policy scenario is from current events, a 
Russian ban on low-value imports from the United States. 
Removal of All Tariffs and Quotas 
  The removal of all tariffs and tariff rate quotas results in a 2.1 million mt, or 60.9 percent, 
increase in poultry trade (see table 6).  Because the removal of all tariffs results in the reduction 
in the relative price of imported poultry products, exports of both high-value and low-value 
poultry products from the three main exporting regions, the US, Brazil, and ROWE increase.  
Conversely, imports of poultry products increase for the three main importing regions:  Japan, 
Russia, and ROWM.  To accommodate the increase in export demand, poultry production in the 
three main exporting regions increase while the increase in import competition leads to a 
reduction in poultry production in the three main importing regions.  However, there are some 
interesting differences that occur within the main exporting and importing regions. 
  While the US is the largest exporter of low-value poultry in the base case, it is a relatively 
small exporter of high-value poultry.  Thus, the US experiences about a ten times larger increase 
in low-value exports (530,000 mt.) compared to its increase in high-value exports (57,000 mt.).  
Since high-value and low-value poultry products are assumed to be produced jointly in fixed 
proportions, the increase in US poultry production required to meet the increase in the export   13
demand for low-value products will result in more high-value poultry being produced than is 
necessary to meet the increase in high-value export demand.  Thus, the US price of high-value 
poultry decreases by 2.6 percent in order to induce an increase in domestic consumption, while 
the US price of low-value poultry increases by 15.8 percent.  This highlights the importance of 
the joint product assumption.  In contrast, because Brazil and ROWE experience relatively 
similar increases in high-value and low-value export sales, the prices of high-value and low-
value poultry both increase in these regions. 
  A similar situation occurs in Japan and Russia.  Because Japan is an importer of high-
value poultry only, any displacement of domestically produced high-value poultry by imported 
poultry will also result in a reduction in domestically produced low-value poultry.  High-value 
imports to Japan increase by 40,000 metric tons while total consumption of high-value poultry 
only increases by 20,000 mt.  Thus, some domestic high-value production is displaced, leading a 
reduction in domestic low-value production as well.  Thus, the price of Japanese high-value 
poultry decreases in the face of import competition while the price of Japanese low-value poultry 
increases due to the joint reduction in Japanese poultry production.  In Russia, who is an 
importer of low-value products only, the opposite situation occurs.  Russian low-value poultry 
products are displaced by imported low-value poultry, leading to a reduction in Russia poultry 
production and an increase in the Russian price of high-value poultry. 
  While the EU and China are major exporters of low-value and high-value poultry 
products respectively, they are also major importers of high-value and low-value poultry 
respectively.  The removal of the TRQ’s in the EU results in a 670,000 mt increase in high-value 
imports into the EU.  As was the case in Japan and Russia, this increase in high-value imports 
displaces a portion of the domestic high-value production in the EU, leading to a 9.3 percent   14
decline in total poultry production in the EU.  Because less low-value poultry is now produced in 
the EU, it can not take advantage of any increase in export demand due to the trade 
liberalization.  As a result, low-value poultry exports from the EU declines slightly (4.3 percent).  
A similar situation occurs in China.  The removal of Chinese tariffs on low-value poultry results 
in a 922,000 mt (103.6 percent) increase in low-value imports.  This substantial increase in low-
value imports displaces some Chinese low-value poultry production, resulting in a decline in 
Chinese high-value production as well.  Thus, the Chinese are not able to respond to an increase 
in high-value poultry export demand, and their high-value exports drop by 60,000 mt or 25 
percent. 
Removal of SPS Barriers 
  In this scenario, all of the SPS barriers listed in table 2 are removed.
10  However, because 
the EU’s TRQ is still in place, removal of the SPS barriers on US and Chinese imports is moot 
because these countries do not have quota rights.  Thus, only the US’s ban on Brazilian and 
Chinese poultry products and Brazil’s ban on US and Chinese poultry products are removed.  
Since the US is a large exporter of low-value poultry, it is only likely that Brazil or China would 
export high-value poultry products to the US.  But given the size of the US poultry sector and the 
differences in the bases prices plus transportation costs, it is unlikely that the lifting of the US 
sanctions would generate a significant amount of export sales.  The same is true for US or 
Chinese exports to Brazil.  Thus, because removing these barriers alone does not really improve 
the potential for increased trade, there is little change between the base case the results for this 
scenario. 
                                                 
10 This does not necessarily imply that all such regulations are unnecessary or protectionist in intent. Full risk-based 
evaluation of the impact of alternative sanitary regulations and the consequences of their modification are needed to 
complete judgments about whether a particular regulatory barrier is an efficient and effective way of controlling 
health dangers.  Here, we limit our analysis to the effects of removing these barriers between our aggregated regions, 
without providing a full assessment of whether doing so would raise sanitary risks among these trading partners.      15
Free Trade 
  Removing all trade barriers simultaneously, in particular all SPS barriers and the EU’s 
TRQ, has a greater impact on world poultry industry than just the sum of removing the barriers 
individually.  The important difference in the results between this scenario and when all tariffs 
and TRQ’s were removed is that now the US and Chinese producers have access to the EU high-
value poultry market.  This leads to substantial increases in high-value export for both the US 
and China (470,000 mt. and 310,000 mt respectively), which displaces a greater amount of EU 
poultry production than in the tariff and TRQ removal case.   
Russian Ban on US Low-Value Poultry Imports 
  An import ban on the US by Russia has the effect of lowering the demand for US low-
value poultry products while increasing the demand for US competitors, namely Brazil and the 
EU.  Consequently, the price of US low-value poultry falls while the price of low-value poultry 
from Brazil and the EU increases.  These relative price changes cause a shift in the trade patterns 
in other regions as well.  The US increases exports of low-value poultry to China by 232,000 mt 
and to the ROWM by 205,000 mt while Brazil and the EU experience lower export sales to these 
regions.  The lower price of low-value poultry also spurs an increase in domestic consumption in 
the US by 190,000 mt.  Overall, US poultry production declines by 110,000 mt or 0.7 percent 
and the US low-value price declines about 6 percent.  However, the decline in the low-value 
price is at least partly offset by a one percent increase in the US high-value poultry price, due to 
a smaller supply being available.  Thus, the impact of the Russian embargo on US poultry 
producers is softened, with the factor price of the poultry specific factor declining by only two 
percent. 
   16
Summary and Conclusions 
  Using a perfectly competitive, spatial equilibrium model, we show that the removal of 
tariff and technical barriers can substantially increase trade in poultry products.  However, the 
removal of sanitary barriers alone has relatively little effect compared to removal of tariffs and 
TRQs, but has more effect if sanitary and other barriers are removed simultaneously.  For 
example, elimination of the sanitary barriers against US poultry imports into the EU will not 
have any effect as long as the EU’s TRQs are still in place.  Imposition of new sanitary barriers 
against US low-value poultry products by Russia would also shift trade flows, but does not have 
as large impacts on US poultry producers as might by expected given the relative large initial US 
export sales to Russia.   17
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Table 1.  Summary of Tariffs Rates Imposed by Non-Composite Regions 
Region  Tariff Rates  Average Rate 
US  Tariffs bound at $0.088/kg for whole chicken and $0.176/kg 
for parts (18-36 percent ad valorem). 
25% 
    
Brazil  Tariffs bound in the WTO at 35 percent on all poultry 
products. 
35% 
    
China  Tariffs of 45 percent on all poultry products.  45% 
    
EU  Tariff of 299 ECU/mt. on whole chicken and 358 ECU/mt. 
on parts (18-60 percent ad valorem).  Tariff-rate quotas 
established with quantities allocated to Brazil and Central and 
Eastern European countries. 
20% 
    
Japan  Tariffs of 11.9 percent on whole chicken and 8.5 percent on 
parts. 
10% 
    
Russia  Tariffs of 30 percent on chicken and 15 percent on turkey.  
Trade agreement with EU gives no special access to 




Source:  USITC, USDA, and WTO Schedules   19
Table 2.  Bilateral SPS Barriers to Poultry Trade 
 Importers 
Exporters  US Brazil EU China  Japan  Russia 
US  --  Banned  Banned Allowed Allowed Allowed 
Brazil  Banned  --  Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed 
EU  Allowed Allowed  --  Allowed Allowed Allowed 
China  Banned Banned Banned  --  Allowed  Allowed 
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Table 3.  Unit Value of 1998 World Poultry Trade, SITC Code 01235, US Dollars per Metric Ton 
 Importers 
         A l l   O t h e r s  
Exporters US  Brazil  EU  China  Japan  Russia  High-Value  Low-Value 
US  --  --  --  647 1112 719 1555 808 
Brazil  --  --  2505 717 1940 558 1774 476 
EU  --  --  --  936 3358 712 1500 710 
China  --  --  --  -- 1890 -- 1563 -- 
A l l   O t h e r s           
High-Value  --  -- 3264 -- 2060 --  --  -- 
Low-Value  --  --  -- 798 -- 885 --  -- 
 
Source:   
 
The UN trade data contained very small quantities of exports from Brazil to Russia, China to Russia, Japan to China, the EU to Japan, 
and All Others to the US, Brazil, and the EU.  Because of their small magnitude, they are dropped from the benchmark trade flows. 
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Table 4.  Benchmark Data 
      Domestic Consumption (+), Exports (+), or Imports (-) 
Country Production  Price  US  Brazil  ROWE  EU China  Japan  Russia  ROWM  Net  Trade 
High-Value  (Million MT)  $/MT  (Million MT) 
US  7.589 1850  7.513        0.076     0.076 
Brazil  2.485 1820  2.328  0.043  0.067  0.047  0.157 
ROWE  4.885 1800    4.699  0.062  0.125     0.187 
EU 4.379  2950    -0.043  -0.062  4.484          -0.105 
China  5.675  1700       5.427  0.194    0.054  0.247 
Japan  0.606  2150  -0.076 -0.067 -0.125    -0.194 1.067      -0.461 
Russia  0.340  2250         0.340    0.000 
ROWM  4.885  2150   -0.047    -0.054     4.986  -0.101 
Total  HV  30.844             
               
Low-Value              
US  7.589  500  5.627      0.491  0.683  0.789  1.962 
Brazil  2.485  545   2.349    0.136       0.136 
ROWE  4.885  600     4.750  0.126  0.010   0.135 
EU  4.379  600       3.803  0.139  0.145  0.292  0.576 
China  5.675  1090  -0.491 -0.136 -0.126 -0.139 6.565        -0.891 
Japan  0.606  650        0.606     0.000 
Russia  0.340  925  -0.683    -0.145    1.168    -0.827 
ROWM  4.885  1040  -0.789    -0.292       5.966  -1.081 
Total  LV  30.844             
Total  61.688             
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Table 5.  Transportation Costs 
  US Brazil EU China  Japan  Russia  ROWE  ROWM 
 Dollars  per  mt. 
US  --  190 180 181 179 195 250 260 
Brazil  190  --  190 230 236 200 250 355 
EU  180 190  --  173 235 212 250 239 
China  181 230 173  --  148 240 181 448 
Japan  179 236 235 148  --  235 131 250 
Russia  195 200 212 240 235  --  464 250 
ROWE  250 250 250 181 131 464  --  350 
ROWM 260 355 239 448 250 250 350  -- 
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Free Trade  Russian 
Ban 
Total Poultry Production (Million  MT) 
US 15.18  15.53  14.98  15.94  15.07 
Brazil 4.97  5.65  4.95  5.50  5.12 
ROWE 9.77  10.37  9.77  10.20  9.77 
EU 8.76  7.94  8.76  7.45  8.78 
China 11.35  10.82  11.48  11.28  11.31 
Japan 1.21  1.16  1.21  1.17  1.21 
Russia 0.68  0.66  0.68  0.66  0.70 
ROWM 9.77  9.54  9.79  9.45  9.71 
Total 61.69  61.67  61.63  61.65  61.68 
          
High-Value Price  ($1,000/MT) 
US 1.85  1.80  1.83  1.84  1.87 
Brazil 1.82  1.91  1.83  1.87  1.77 
ROWE 1.80  1.86  1.80  1.83  1.80 
EU 2.95  2.71  2.95  2.60  2.93 
China 1.70  1.81  1.72  1.88  1.70 
Japan 2.15  2.05  2.16  2.06  2.15 
Russia 2.25  2.31  2.25  2.31  2.18 
ROWM 2.15  2.24  2.15  2.22  2.16 
          
Low-Value Price           
US 0.50  0.58  0.51  0.57  0.47 
Brazil 0.55  0.65  0.53  0.65  0.64 
ROWE 0.60  0.63  0.60  0.63  0.60 
EU 0.60  0.72  0.60  0.75  0.62 
China 1.09  0.92  1.08  0.90  1.08 
Japan 0.65  0.70  0.65  0.69  0.65 
Russia 0.93  0.83  0.93  0.83  1.04 
ROWM 1.04  0.92  1.04  0.93  1.02 
          
Total High-Value Exports  (Million MT) 
US 0.08  0.14  0.11  0.55  0.07 
Brazil 0.16  0.51  0.20  0.47  0.19 
ROWE 0.19  0.54  0.24  0.36  0.25 
China 0.25  0.19  0.29  0.56  0.18 
Total 0.67  1.38  0.84  1.95  0.68 
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Free Trade  Russian 
Ban 
Total Low-Value Exports  (Million MT) 
US 1.96  2.53  1.91  2.69  1.72 
Brazil 0.14  0.63  0.16  0.61  0.38 
ROWE 0.14  0.51  0.13  0.44  0.14 
EU 0.58  0.55  0.58  0.40  0.65 
Total 2.81  4.22  2.78  4.14  2.90 
          
Total High-Value Imports           
US 0.00  0.00  0.14  0.14  0.00 
Brazil 0.00  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.00 
EU 0.11  0.78  0.11  1.11  0.11 
Japan 0.46  0.51  0.46  0.50  0.46 
Russia 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
ROWM 0.10  0.09  0.10  0.15  0.11 
          
Total Low-Value Imports           
Brazil 0.00  0.00  0.05  0.04  0.00 
China 0.89  1.81  0.84  1.65  0.97 
Russia 0.84  0.86  0.83  0.87  0.75 
ROWM 1.08  1.54  1.06  1.58  1.18 
          
High-Value Consumption           
US 7.51  7.62  7.52  7.56  7.47 
Brazil 2.33  2.32  2.31  2.33  2.37 
ROWE 4.70  4.67  4.70  4.69  4.70 
EU 4.48  4.75  4.49  4.84  4.50 
China 5.43  5.20  5.40  5.13  5.42 
Japan 1.07  1.09  1.06  1.08  1.07 
Russia 0.34  0.33  0.34  0.33  0.35 
ROWM 4.99  4.86  4.99  4.88  4.97 
          
Low-Value Consumption           
US 5.63  5.23  5.58  5.28  5.82 
Brazil 2.35  2.20  2.37  2.19  2.18 
ROWE 4.75  4.68  4.75  4.66  4.74 
EU 3.80  3.42  3.80  3.33  3.74 
China 6.57  7.22  6.58  7.29  6.63 
Japan 0.61  0.58  0.61  0.58  0.61 
Russia 1.18  1.19  1.17  1.20  1.10 
ROWM 5.97  6.31  5.95  6.31  6.04 
 